

■ Special Issue ■

## A Limitation of Multicultural Education from Simone Weil's Understanding of Justice\*

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### Abstract

This paper brings to light a critical limitation of multicultural education finding insights in Simone Weil's understanding of justice. Weil distinguishes justice as rights from justice as compassion. While today's discourse of justice mainly concerns the former, she claims justice in the latter sense is crucial. Weil points that the fight for justice tends to fall into a competition for rights and power, and the competitive attitude not only has us forget compassion but it also hinders our compassionate response to others and hence genuine justice. The dimensions of multicultural education such as equity, equality, and cultural representation, are generally debated with the language of rights, which drives us to concern power and privilege, degrades what is fought for, and degenerates the fight itself. It thus forecloses the possibility of justice. For Weil justice originates in the recognition of the common human condition among people in different cultures and circumstances rather than the recognition of cultural identity, emphasizing the value of difference and diversity, which is usually multiculturalism's main focus.

■ **Keywords** : multicultural education, justice, compassion, rights, love, Simone Weil

### Introduction

Multiculturalism seeks proper responses to the diversity of culture and religion. It concerns wide issues including ethnicity, race, language, and religion and aims at dissolving various disadvantages that minority groups have suffered by calling for recognition and positive accommodation of them and their cultures. It demands more than toler-

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ance of the difference; it claims for re-evaluation of cultural identities that have been underrepresented by cultural majority. Multiculturalism has been widely discussed in the education field. In France, the case of Muslim girls prohibited to wear headscarves, a religious dress, to schools provoked big discussion (Bowen, 2007). In the U.S., accommodation of minority groups in schools, often women and people of color, has been largely discussed by educationists as well as non-specialists since the 1960s. Affirmative action is proposed and provokingly practiced to ensure equal access to higher education. Meantime, school curriculum is generally expected to reflect a culturally diverse society, incorporating study materials from cultural minorities. In classrooms, special arrangements are made for students from those backgrounds. Re-evaluating underrepresented or neglected cultures and seeking equity and equality are important and indispensable to overcome discrimination and prejudice that exist in schools. Nevertheless, these approaches tend to degenerate into fights for power and privilege, and that can conceal the possibility of justice based on compassionate love. This paper brings to light this critical limitation of multicultural education finding insights in Simone Weil's understanding of justice. Weil distinguishes justice as rights from justice as compassion, and she claims only the latter is justice in its proper sense. Weil's insight that justice is more than rights is largely missing in current discourse of justice.<sup>1)</sup> Weil points that the fight for justice tends to fall into a competition for rights and power and the competitive attitude not only has us forget compassion but it also hinders our compassionate response to others and hence justice. For Weil real justice originates in the recognition of the common human condition among people in different circumstances rather than the recognition of how one is different from the others which is usually multiculturalism's main focus. The paper has two sections. In the first section, it confirms the basic orientation of multicultural education by seeing dimensions of multicultural education and then discusses the limitation of it. In the second section, it introduces Weil's understanding of justice, deepens the discussion of the limitation, and suggests a different direction multi-

cultural education should take.

### **Dimensions of Multicultural Education**

There are different conceptualizations and typologies of multicultural education and there is disagreement over what multicultural education means. Before I discuss Weil's notion of justice and its implication to multicultural education, I would like to confirm general consensus over the meaning of multicultural education by going over two review papers. One is James Banks' comprehensive review of the discourse of multicultural education published in 1993 and the other is by Chapman and Grant published in 2010. The paper could mention more studies, but the purpose of this essay is not to come up with another review paper. I limit it just as enough as to capture the overall direction or basic principles which this study intends to address. The authors of both articles are considered to be authoritative scholars and I believe their articles can be used at least as a starting point of discussion.

In his review article "Multicultural Education: Historical Development, Dimensions, and Practice" published in 1993, Banks confirms that the major goal of multicultural education is to promote educational equality among students from diverse racial, ethnic, and social-class backgrounds and for both male and female students by restructuring school and other educational institutions. Banks notes how the discourse of multicultural education is heated in the popular press and among non-specialists and tells that they tend to focus only on curriculum reformation. Banks claims that multicultural education is more comprehensive involving teaching materials, teaching and learning styles, attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of teachers and administrators, and the culture of school, in addition to changes in curriculum (p. 4).

Banks thus identifies five approaches or dimensions of multicultural education: content integration, knowledge construction process, prejudice reduction, equity pedagogy, and empowering school culture and social structure. Content integration aims at bringing into education cultural re-

sources from diverse backgrounds. The challenge against the idea of canonical texts as predominantly white male cultures and the need of curriculum reform are brought in this spirit. Further, it is claimed that teachers should use examples, data, stories, and so on from a variety of cultures including minority groups in illustrating ideas, theories, and principles. Knowledge construction process pays attention to how racial, ethnic, and social-class elements influence the construction of knowledge. It aims at incorporating the background condition behind diverse cultural knowledge brought into curriculum and teaching materials. Prejudice reduction is an approach to intervene with students to reduce prejudice toward racial minorities, help them develop more a positive attitude toward them, and thus nurture democratic values. Equity pedagogy is a dimension of multicultural education that promotes fair academic achievement of students from diverse racial, ethnic, and social-class backgrounds. Teachers are expected to use particular methods and strategies to facilitate this to happen especially for those students from low-income families and students of color. Empowering school culture and social structure is an approach to restructure school organization and its culture so that students from diverse backgrounds may experience educational equality and empowerment of their own culture. This dimension prepares environments that make the other four approaches more effective (Cummins, 1986).

Much has happened since the publication of Banks' review article in 1993. However, a more recent review by Chapman and Grant published in 2010 claims that the major goal of multicultural education stays the same. Reviewing the multicultural education literature of the last 30 years, Chapman and Grant emphasize the same point that the discourse of multicultural education is broader than curriculum reform. Further, their review reflects more recent movements and mentions the inclusion of groups that were not mentioned in Banks' article such as sexual minorities and students with physical, mental, and emotional exceptionalities, elderly students, and students from one-parent families. Chapman and Grant, however, end their review by borrowing Herbert Spencer's words:

What remains clear throughout the progression of scholarship in MCE [multi-cultural education] the past thirty years is that multiculturalists continue to grapple with the same two questions concerning ‘Whose knowledge should be privileged’ and ‘What knowledge should be taught.’ (p. 44)

The discourse of multicultural education scholarship is still generally limited to the dimension of curriculum reform which Banks named the content integration.

We may thus summarize the major aims of multicultural education as promoting (1) fair cultural representation in curriculum (2) equity through special arrangements to facilitate academic achievement especially of low-income students and students of color, (3) equality of access to education among diverse racial, ethnic, economic, and gender backgrounds and (4) broader social justice in a school environment that claims for rights of the members of minority groups reducing prejudice and fighting against discrimination. Multicultural education should thus be considered to have a broader scope than curriculum reform, but the discussion tends to focus on the questions related to curriculum such as “What knowledge should be privileged?” and “What knowledge should be taught?”

No argument is necessary for the value of such approaches of multicultural education and efforts to amend persistent injustice, unfairness, and inequality. The evils of ethnocentrism and the hegemony of white male culture overshadow education practice in our society. The value of knowledge has been determined by the power of the culture. Culture and knowledge of the minority groups are misrepresented, under-valued, ignored, or even destroyed. As multicultural educationists have argued, there is urgent need to change this situation and re-evaluate the values of culture and knowledge of those less powerful minority groups. At the same time, seeking equity and equality is crucial in order to correct the serious historical injustices and achieve balance. I have nothing against fair accommodation and special arrangements for students with

particular needs. Neither have I anything against the ideal of equal access to education and opportunity for success. Some sociologists and economists of education point out that, rather than diminishing inequality, today's educational system reproduces social inequality (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). For example, high-income parents can "buy" their children a "better" education from early childhood. Their chances of being accepted by prestigious colleges and universities are higher than for children from low-income parents. As a result, income differences between the two groups and so the socio-economic structure maintains itself, if not enlarged (Wells, 2006). Income is not the only factor, given the other inequalities based on social class, race, ethnicity, gender, and other cultural backgrounds (Apple, 1982). The need of reforms that enhance social mobility and equal access is too obvious.

Nevertheless, I contend that those approaches are inadequate. First, with regard to the primary dimension of multicultural education, i.e., cultural recognition and curriculum reform, the discussion can easily turn to hostile exchange of claims for power and pride. In seeking for proper cultural recognition, people often necessarily end up trying to gain more power. If a group fails to obtain proper recognition from others, it needs to find another way. Unfortunately that is often done by raising a louder voice and showing power so the group can make others admit the value of its culture. Thinking about school curriculum, school hours per year are limited. In order to save certain hours for the study of a minority culture and its knowledge, the group must compete with the majority or other minority groups and win them over. Even if a group succeeds in obtaining a satisfactory amount of hours, it will need to continue fighting to maintain it. It is like a fight for the rightful share of a cake. Each group has the idea of the "proper" amount it deserves and it is usually very hard to reach the state of harmony where everyone is happy for the size of their piece.

The discussion thus stimulates their attitude to compare them with others and their desire for further recognition that alone can increase their sense of pride. One's sense of identity and the culture one belongs

is inseparable. How well the culture one belongs is recognized and valued affects one's sense of pride. The predominance of the concern for curriculum reform in multicultural educationists indicates that their primary concern is cultural identity and pride. When a culture of a minority group (A) is recognized well in a society, another minority group (B) will claim "Why is our culture not valued as much as, or more than A? We are better than A. Our culture's value should be recognized higher!" Once B's culture is recognized higher than A, A's pride is partly deprived and A will re-claim for further recognition to overpower B. Another group (C) may join the competition at any time. The dispute for pride is endless because the point of balance for one group is usually different from that of another. And often these contentions are tied to economic reasons because the recognition from the whole society is the condition for receiving a grant from the government and other privileges that may be used for further recognition of the group. Thus, the discourse for the recognition of the minority groups tends to degenerate into the fight for power (both political and economic) and pride and it is very hard to find peaceful coexistence in most cases.

One of the crucial problems of multiculturalism is the problem of minorities within minorities; this problem confirms my point that the struggle for cultural recognition can be degenerated easily into the fight for power and privilege. The problem is that when a group of minorities are provided with the right of self-determination, they will enjoy the right they obtained and exert power over the minorities within that group, not admitting rights to internal minorities (Green, 1994). For instance, suppose giving the right of self-determination to a minority group M in which women's right for education is not recognized. Internal minorities in this case are women. By giving the right of self-determination to M, M's rejection of women's right for education is justified. What this problem of internal minorities tells is that once a minority group is given the right of self-determination and power, they will not share it with other minorities. They will exert power over the internal minorities and enjoy the privilege. If internal minorities want to change the situation,

they have to engage in a fight and win their rights. Multiculturalism does not seem to have a reasonable solution to this problem. What is crucially missing here is the attitude of sharing with other people (often those less privileged) and the need of education of fellowship and love of others. I will argue for it soon borrowing Simone Weil's notion of justice as compassionate love.

The second reason why the approaches of multicultural education are inadequate concerns the dimensions of educational equity and equality. In fighting for equity and equality, we should question "Equity for what?" and "For what sense of equality?" Current education discourse is dominated by the culture of measurement (Biesta, 2010). Educational achievement is standardized and measured by test scores. Within such context, we realize that the fight for equity and equality is basically the same as the fight for cultural recognition as it often ends up a fight for power and privilege. The focus of multicultural educationists who argue for equity is academic achievement. And it is generally a matter of test scores influenced by today's emphasis on them. Their hope is to see similar average points among diverse cultural and economic backgrounds. The economic perspective is favored in most discourses about education today. People believe test scores are important because they are index for economy. On the level of a society, test scores are the index of the future national economy as well as the rationale by which the allocation of budgets is decided. Under the pressure of a competitive global economy, greater emphasis is put on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education, while the arts and humanities are downplayed (Gonzales & Kuenzi, 2012; Cohen, 2009). Arguably, STEM education is critically important for the national economy which is fueled by scientific and technological innovations. Thus, the discussion of education policy is mostly processed by accountability that can be reduced to economic calculations. On the individual level, many parents want their children to have a college degree, preferably from a prestigious college or university. They believe it is vital for the quality of their children's lives because a degree will eventually provide



a great advantage in finding good employment. Some children in a secondary school also share this belief and increasingly think of higher education in terms of a possible job and income after graduation. In a *New York Times* article, Stainburn reported on this situation: we now have college rankings based on the income of graduates and more people are choosing college based on future incomes.

What does it mean to seek for the equity of academic achievement in such a climate where education is viewed predominantly as a means for economic advantage? Fighting for the equity of academic achievement is translated into the fight for fair distribution of power and privilege. The same argument can be made concerning the claim for equality of access and opportunity of success. If education is viewed mostly as a means for power and privilege, the fight for equality of access means the fight for equal access for power and privilege. John Wilson, a philosopher of education, criticizes the notion of educational equality and points out that education is not like a piece of cake which can be sliced up (Wilson, 1991). This goes back to my previous point about cultural recognition that the discourse tends to be contentious like a dispute over a larger piece of cake and never reaches a peaceful consensus. Furthermore, I am inclined to ask questions: Are these what multicultural educationists are really fighting for? Are they not fighting for equity and equality based on the belief that education is something intrinsically valuable that is irreducible to economic terms? Is it not the case that what we really want from multicultural education is the development of compassionate love that extends beyond cultural differences and that has nothing to do with or even is the opposite of seeking of power and privilege? If so, should not multicultural educationists (or educationists in general) fight against the *culture* of measurement before fighting for cultural diversity?

Re-evaluating underrepresented cultures and listening to the voices of minority groups are important. Incorporating in curriculum resources from diverse cultures should be encouraged. Retrieving balance that was deprived through the history of injustice is an urgent issue of democratic multicultural society. Fighting against apparent inequalities in educational

values is necessary. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the approaches of multicultural education can easily degenerate into fight for power and pride and can in fact close off the possibility of compassion and love of others on which, as I will argue below, multicultural education should be built.

### **Simone Weil's Understanding of Justice**

In the previous section, it was pointed out that the discourse of multicultural education can easily degenerate into a fight for power and privilege. In this section, I discuss Simone Weil's understanding of justice because it elucidates the logic behind the degeneration and suggests an important perspective that is missing in the discourse of multicultural education.

In the essay "Human Personality," Weil (1977) contrasts justice with rights by relating them to two distinct cries. One is "Why has somebody else got more than I have?" which refers to rights. The other is "Why am I being hurt?" which corresponds to justice (p. 344). The former cry is the cry of "a little boy [who watches] jealously to see if his brother has a slightly larger piece of cake" (Ibid., p. 315). This is a cry for a rightful share and fair distribution. Meanwhile, what is at stake in the latter is something irreducible in each human being. Weil writes:

At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being. (Ibid.)

Each human being has the fundamental expectation that no harm will be done to him or her. Thus, when a cry rises from the depth of the heart and the soul—"Why am I being hurt?"—there is always injustice (Ibid., p. 314). Thus, Weil concludes, "Justice consists in seeing that no harm is done to men" (Ibid., p. 334). To put it differently, justice

is the compassionate response to those who suffer. She claims that these two cries and thus two levels of justice—one concerning rights, the other concerning the good and something irreducible—must be distinguished and only the latter is justice in its proper sense. “The word justice means two very different things according to whether it refers to the one or the other level. It is only the former [expectation of good] that matters” (Ibid., p. 315).

Here, I should note that Weil’s word is too strong in negating the language of rights altogether, and I agree with Peter Winch, who clarifies that is not what Weil really means. Winch (1989) writes:

Although, as we see, she expresses herself strongly about the language of rights, it is important to realize that she is not rejecting it as always inappropriate. I think her discussion does not even rule out the possibility that injustice may, in some cases, actually take the form of a violation of somebody’s rights. That is not the same thing as saying, though, that this is what the injustice *consists in*. . . . [I]t may be that in some circumstances to struggle for rights is the best way of struggling for justice. But that does not mean that the struggle for justice is the same as the struggle for rights. . . . And if the distinction is forgotten, there is the danger that a concern for rights will take one farther and farther away from justice; or that the quest for justice will be entirely submerged. (p. 181)

I agree with Winch and think Weil could have emphasized that justice is *not only* a matter of rights, and hence injustice is *not only* a matter of the violation of rights. However, the point should be well maintained: something critically important is missing in the language of rights. The last sentence in the above quotation from Winch is crucial. If the distinction between justice and rights is forgotten, our concern begins to degenerate, the discourse will be dominated by the fight for rights, and the possibility of justice and compassionate love will be foreclosed. I will comment on this further in short, but this is exactly what I pointed out in the previous section with regard to the trend in the discourse of multicultural education.

There are several reasons why Weil thinks that the language of rights is inadequate. Here I focus on two of them that are pertinent to the present issue. The first reason is that the language of rights degrades what one is fighting for. Particularly, it debases human dignity into something reducible to economic values. Weil (1977) characterizes the language of rights as follows: “The notion of right is linked with the notion of sharing out, of exchange, of measured quantity. It has a commercial flavor, essentially evocative of legal claims and arguments” (p. 323). The language of rights implies the logic of market. There is nothing wrong if rights could be exchanged with money. However, whenever there is injustice, the person’s dignity is at stake. Weil’s contrast between a farmer and a young girl is illuminating:

Relying almost exclusively on this notion [of rights], it becomes impossible to keep one’s eyes on the real problem. If someone tries to brow-beat a farmer to sell his eggs at a moderate price, the farmer can say: I have the right to keep my eggs if I don’t get a good enough price.’ But if a young girl is being forced into a brothel she will not talk about her rights. In such a situation the word would sound ludicrously inadequate. (Ibid., p. 325)

The young girl’s claim for her rights in this scenario would be ridiculous because the language of rights implies that money can buy her dignity. What is at stake is nothing comparable with eggs or other goods that can be price-tagged.<sup>2)</sup> What matters here is the girl’s cry from the depth of her soul, “Why do I have to be treated like this?” and her dignity as a human being. Weil thinks the language of rights fails to respond to this cry. Rather, it degenerates it and degrades the dignity of her existence.

The second reason is that the language of rights is improper because it evokes contention and forecloses the possibility of fellowship or compassion. This point is continuous from the first reason. Once the object of fight is degraded, the fight itself is degenerated, loses fair and honorable attitude, and ends up as fierce competition for power. Weil

(1977) observes the difference of the tone between the language of justice and the language of rights:

If you say to someone who has ears to hear: 'What you are doing to me is not just', you may touch and awaken at its source the spirit of attention and love. But it is not the same with words like 'I have the right ...' or 'you have no right to ...' they evoke a latent war and awaken the spirit of contention. To place the notion of rights at the centre of social conflicts is to inhibit any possible impulse of charity on both sides. (p. 325)

The language of rights tends to stir up disputes and fights. Although Weil herself does not explain at least in this quotation why the language of rights has this nature, it is not hard to see it provided with the first reason. Once the language of rights degrades what one is fighting for, the fight itself degenerates. The fight that could have been full of fair and honorable attitude now turns to fight without such virtue. Only those who have more power can claim their share. "Rights are always asserted in a tone of contention; and when this tone is adopted, it must rely upon force in the background, or else it will be laughed at" (Ibid., p. 323). When one claims one's rights, one must make others admit them. Otherwise they are empty. Naturally, one will end up seeking power so that one can make others listen to him. Even if he succeeds, someone else may overpower and claim her right. Thus people's desire for power only enlarges often accompanied by the fear to lose it. Using the language of rights in such contexts can paradoxically prevent a manifestation of justice as compassion and mislead us into contention.

As an illustrating example, think of international politics and how violations of human rights are often neglected by United Nations as a result of endowing with the right of refusal, i.e. the power of veto, to the permanent members of the Security Council. Having exceptional voice in global society, the members of the Council in protecting and promoting their own national interest can wield the veto and override human rights of people on the other side of the world who are affected

by international and domestic conflicts and other grave issues.

One is captured by the logic of force and fear as its reverse side before one notices and they drive us for more power and privilege. Thinking that one is fighting for justice, one is ruled by the logic of force and the possibility is closed for justice and compassionate love. Put differently, fighting for apparent justice can make us preclude genuine justice. This is what Winch (1989) says in the last sentence of the passage I quoted above: “And if the distinction [between rights and justice] is forgotten, there is the danger that a concern for rights will take one farther and farther away from justice; or that the quest for justice will be entirely submerged” (p. 181). Weil thus suggests justice that is beyond the language of rights. For Weil, justice consists in the realization of the degeneration of fights and the refusal of the logic of force.

Weil then claims that genuine justice is synonymous with compassionate love of others that emerges only after we see in ourselves those who are from different backgrounds and in various circumstances. In other words, it requires us to see and recognize other people’s reality as nothing different from ours and to feel compelled to ease their suffering. It is indispensable to see ourselves in the suffering of others. “The sense of human misery is a pre-condition of justice and love” (Weil, 1965, p. 28). The logic of force and the misery it causes are the ontological conditions of human beings. A victor at one time will be a victim at another. Commenting on *Iliad*, Weil writes, “The human race is not divided up, in the *Iliad*, into conquerors and chiefs on the other. In the poem there is not a single man who does not at one time or another have to bow his neck to force” (Ibid., p. 11). The *Iliad*’s characters such as Achilles, Agamemnon, Hector, and Ajax, each of them at one time possesses the power to control other people and is intoxicated by the illusory greatness of oneself and pride. But at another time, each one of them is made to be ashamed or frightened by the force others possess. It is an inevitable condition of human beings.

Perhaps all men, by the very act of being born, are destined to suffer

violence; yet this is a truth to which circumstance shuts men's eyes. The strong are, as a matter of fact, never absolutely strong, nor are the weak absolutely weak, but neither is aware of this. They have in common a refusal to believe that they both belong to the same species. (Ibid., p. 13)

Not one of us is free from suffering injustice. Every victor is one day a victim because no one is "absolutely" powerful. One is more powerful than the other only relatively and temporarily. Similarly, a rich person, who achieved enormous success and believed he was a winner in the socio-economic competition, may one day lose everything, perhaps through a sudden economic depression, a betrayal from a colleague, or some other unpredictable incidents. People easily overlook this reality and forget that everyone is equal on these terms. Thus Weil writes:

He who does not realize to what extent shifting fortune and necessity hold in subjection every human spirit, cannot regard as fellow-creatures nor love as he loves himself those whom chance separated from him by an abyss. The variety of constraints pressing upon man give rise to the illusion of several distinct species that cannot communicate. Only he who has measured the dominion of force, and knows how not to respect it, is capable of love and justice. (Ibid., p. 28)

Seeing squarely the misery of others is of the utmost importance for justice and love. Only by seeing ourselves in the suffering of others, understanding that all human beings equally share this wretched condition, and without worshipping force or power, can we really "learn that there is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortunate" (Ibid., p. 30). Strangers are not really strangers; their affliction is not unrelated to us. We are equally vulnerable as those in affliction. Recognizing this opens up the possibility for justice and love.

As I cautioned by quoting Winch, Weil is not rejecting the value of the fight for rights all together and hence the present discourse of multicultural education. However, from Weil's understanding of justice,

I contend that we need to be aware of the danger of degeneration inherent in the multicultural educationists' fight. Moreover, something critically important is missing that is the perspective of how we may nurture justice and compassionate love of others that alone can provide genuine ground for multicultural education. Rather than running around and be busy empowering cultural identity emphasizing differences (superiority), we could learn to see other people's suffering and see ourselves in them. Visiting museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki or Auschwitz-Birkenau, for example, does not need to be done as an expression of solidarity to one's race, nation, and culture. Seeing and witnessing the suffering of people from any background in any circumstance, when properly done, fosters recognition of the common human condition and opens the possibility for justice and compassionate love.

### **Conclusion**

Rather than focusing on cultural identity, emphasizing the value of difference and diversity, being motivated by self-pride, Weil highlights the need for the recognition of the common human ground because it is the pre-condition for genuine justice that alone can alleviate injustice deep down. The dimensions of multicultural education such as equity, equality, and cultural representation, are generally debated with the language of rights, which drives us to concern power and privilege, degrades what is fought for, and degenerates the fight itself. It thus forecloses the possibility of genuine justice. Instead, we could create the discourse around such words as justice, love, and compassion. This paper has not discussed how we may develop justice and love through actual educational practice. It requires a separate study. However, if multicultural education aims at promoting and developing such justice, Weil's philosophy is worthy of serious consideration.



- 1) The current discourse of justice is predominated by John Rawls' justice that mainly concerns rights.
- 2) This resonates with Kant's distinction between dignity and price. Kant writes: "Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity" (p. 435). The page number is Academy edition of the book. In the translation I used, it is page 51: Immanuel Kant. (1997). *Foundations of the metaphysics of morals*, (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). (L. W. Beck, Trans.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

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